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ABSTRACT 
 
The ‘Wretched Petitioners’: Jamaican Maroon’s Petitions, 1795-1800 
 
In 1795 the Jamaican Maroons from Trelawney Town revolted against the 
British. The rebellion was short lived but sent shockwaves across the Island 
that saw the British Governor, Lord Balcarres, gather the Assembly of Jamaica 
and order the removal of the rebellious Maroons. The Jamaican Maroons 
responded to Barclarres, not with renewed violence, but with British legal 
strategies by employing petitions in order to try and salvage their stay on the 
Island.  
 
Sic Semper Tyrannis: Catiline and Caesar in Early American Insults, Allusions, 
and The Whiskey Rebellion, 1789-1804 
 
The use of classical allusions in Early America was commonplace amongst 
elites. But the way these allusions were employed as insults during the 
Whiskey Rebellion helps to better understand what was at stake for both the 
rebels and the government trying to crush them.   
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Intellectual Biography 
 
Charting the creation of my two papers is not difficult, connecting them into any 
sense of a coherent story is nearly impossible. This lack of a linear trajectory, rather than 
creating unnecessary confusion in my progress as a scholar, has helped me to expand the 
questions that I ask, and the places I go to find them. While my two papers are on vastly 
different people, in different places, with different sources, they do share a 
methodological similarity: an intensely deep reading of a few sources. Working on these 
two research papers has taught me numerous lessons but certainly a key one being how to 
take whatever few lines you can find in the archive and spin them into a story. The fear of 
speculation, once ever-present and suffocating, was forced to subside to the need for 
clarification. While answers, in a purely factual and objective manner may prove elusive 
to modern historians, this desire to tap into the archive for everything it is worth and use 
that knowledge to tell untold stories was incredibly fulfilling and enlightening. Thus, my 
journey into academia was really two separate thrusts connected by the methodology.  
My first paper was written in Guillaume Aubert’s Atlantic World and the Law 
Seminar. A class that was both focused in space and topic forcing me to negotiate new 
aspects of an Atlantic World I foolishly thought I was beginning to understand. The legal 
aspect of the class forced me to challenge my typical topical interests and engage sources 
in a new manner. For my undergraduate thesis I had written on the Jamaican Maroons. 
They were part of a larger project on the ways that the British managed, digested, and 
then presented surrender ceremonies throughout the Atlantic World. The Maroons 
fascinated me, and I realized there was more to the story of the 1795 rebellion than just 
how the British presented the surrender ceremony back in the metropole. To this end, I 
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reexamined the Jamaican Maroon rebellion of 1795, this time from the Maroon’s vantage 
point, and discovered a fascinating tale of Maroon resistance to the British. This was no 
longer armed resistance, in fact, in many ways it wasn’t resistance at all but calculated 
manipulation of the legal system that sought to control them. In this way, the Maroons 
accepted their role within the empire in order to exploit the legal advantages that 
accompanied their status as subjects. Thus, my paper “’Wretched Petitioners’: Jamaican 
Maroons’ Petitions 1795-1800” was created.  
This paper was a dedicated source analysis of the Maroon petitions themselves 
and how they used these documents to their advantage to operate within the British 
system. I had never worked with such limited sources but it made for a good challenge. A 
challenge that was worthwhile  as British history is easy to tell but it’s relationship to 
Maroon history is much harder to access, but no less important. In fact, at least in my 
reading of the Maroon’s successful coopting of the British legal system to their advantage 
all sorts of interesting questions about subjecthood, empire, subalterns, and legal systems 
are raised. Because of these implications this paper is one I would be interested in 
moving forward with in the future.  
In order to do that I believe there are three big areas I need to explore further. The 
first is to more deeply and thoughtfully engagement with the historiography of the 
Jamaican Maroons, but also of the British legal and imperial system they chose to operate 
within. Secondly, undertake a more nuanced and researched exploration of Maroon 
society. The Maroons, due to the limitations of the paper and myself as a historian, were 
not explored enough as a cultural or social group in order to fully understand how or why 
they ended up accepting British subjecthood in order to use the legal system to their 
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advantage. By further exploring Maroon culture and identifying their history with the 
British on Jamaica the papers’ focus on their ability to use British legal channels will be 
greatly improved. Finally, an expansion of sources is necessary to fully develop this 
paper into an article or dissertation chapter. There are some great sources, the Ross diary, 
letters from Governor Balcarres or General Walpole, as well as letters from Maroons 
themselves that need to be incorporated into the story to better situate the petitions and 
their role within Maroon and British relations.  
My second paper came out of Josh Piker’s Colonial America class and took a very 
different topic on than the Maroons, or law, or empire. Linked topically at best by its 
connection to rebellion, it is really the methodology that fits these papers together. The 
paper is “Sic Semper Tyrannis: Catiline and Caesar in Early American Insults, Allusions, 
and the Whiskey Rebellion, 1789-1804.” The goal of the paper is to examine the ways 
that Early Americans used classical allusions to Caesar and Catiline not just as simple 
insults, but also as historic warnings of the very real danger of rebellion and civil war. 
The methodological similarity comes from the fact that the sources were scarce for this 
project. While I have no further ambitions with this paper I do believe with further 
research and more sources its argument could be made even stronger.  
The paper for Piker’s class attempted to distance itself from the historiography of 
classicism that focuses on high political culture, like republican systems of government 
and values. Rather, the intention was to look at low or personal politics and the way that 
classics permeated a much wider swath of society in order to influence how Early 
Americans viewed their world. To do this, I attempted to tell the narrative of the Whiskey 
Rebellion through the classical allusions drawn by Early Americans with Caesar and 
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Catiline. The small source base once again forced me to think creatively and engage with 
the archive in a way that was not disingenuous but still stretched the source material. In 
order to accomplish this, I also had to engage heavily with the classical material itself, a 
topic of deep personal interest. To further this project a stronger engagement with the 
progression from ancient times to Early America is necessary to better connect the role of 
classics within the framework of the Whiskey Rebellion.  
By working on these two papers I was able to explore two topically vast ideas, 
both of which I am personally interested in as a historian. Thus, these papers allowed me 
to continue to refine my desired historic expertise by engaging broadly rather than 
narrowly. The methodology of both is linked in the small source base and need to read 
between the lines of the archive to create an argument. By working on these papers I 
developed research skills, like reading between the lines of the archive and creatively 
connecting, what at first appears disparate like Jamaican Maroons and British law or 
Early Americans and Caesar and Catiline.  
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 The ‘Wretched Petitioners’: Jamaican Maroon’s Petitions, 1795-1800  
 
On October 1, 1800 a party of sixty Maroons, or free blacks, landed in Sierra 
Leone, under a “violent Tornado,” and proceeded to spend the next few days subduing 
rebels in the area.1 Thus, began the final leg of an odyssey that spanned almost more 
places than years. For these Maroons, used so quickly as agents of empire in Sierra Leone 
by helping police the colony, came by way of Nova Scotia. Halifax, however, was not 
their port of origin, that was a different Atlantic Island thousands of miles away, Jamaica. 
What led a group of free blacks from Jamaica, to Nova Scotia, and eventually to Sierra 
Leone?2 The Jamaican Maroons from Trelawney Town were forced into exile by war and 
forced to survive in an Atlantic world that was growing more crowded and connected in 
the long 18th century. The Maroons were not wandering lost and alone but within a 
British Imperial and Atlantic framework. A framework they were willing and able to 
exploit through legal channels to maintain as much autonomy as possible. This paper will 
explore how the Jamaican Maroons used legal channels to confront British Imperial aims 
that threatened their freedom, and through legal posturing, presented themselves as both 
autonomous and loyal subjects of the Crown. The Maroons of Trelawney Town used 
varied strategies to achieve their aims, focusing heavily in Jamaica on military exploits 
and family tropes they turned to petitioning to a wider range of white intermediaries, like 
General Walpole, in Nova Scotia to better promote their goals.  
 When Oliver Cromwell sent his troops on the ‘Western Design’ in 1655 Jamaica 
was not the destination. The Spanish, however, proved resolute in their defense of 
																																																						
1 “Ross Journal”, in Back to Africa: George Ross and the Maroons: From Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone, ed.  
Mavis Campbell (Trenton New Jersey, Africa World Press, 1993), 15-19.  
2 In 1841 the Maroons would eventually return to Jamaica by way of Petitions as well but this last leg of 
their journey is beyond the scope of this paper. 		
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Hispaniola leaving the English commanders desperate for redemption. Jamaica offered an 
easier target and was quickly conquered, the Spanish abandoning the island without 
offering any major resistance. The Spanish left behind a sizeable group of escaped slaves 
and free blacks that “overmatched…submitted” to the English forces. This marked the 
first meeting of Jamaican Maroons and English forces and was quickly followed up by an 
agreement between the English and these Maroons who “craving English 
protection...[are] authoriz’d to prey upon, and hunt their fellows.” This early agreement 
marked the first, and often overlooked, example of Maroon cooperation with English 
authorities in order to safeguard their own autonomy.3  
 The Maroons, however, did not submit as easily as Edmund Hickeringill, who 
wrote an early treatise on the status of Jamaica, hoped but fought on. Sporadic bursts of 
violence erupted between the Maroons and English until the violence became too much 
for both communities. Unable, or unwilling, to continue such a costly war the British first 
approached the Maroons offering terms of peace in 1738. The subsequent treaty of 1739 
had two important clauses: first, the Maroons were formerly recognized as free and 
legally protected from harm under British Law. Second, they were conscripted into the 
slave society in the role of slave hunters.4 In this way they were isolated in a middle 
ground between white Britons and enslaved blacks. In addition, while the Maroons were 
given land to call their own, some of which was Trelawney Town itself, named after the 
Governor at the time, they were not totally independent.5  A British superintendent was 
																																																						
3 Edmund Hickeringill, Jamaica Viewed (1661), 42-44.  
4 Anon, An abridgment of the laws of Jamaica… (London, 1756), 26.  
5 Barbara Kopytoff, Jamaican Maroon Political Organization: The Effects of the Treaties, in Social and 
Economic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1976, 90.		
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stationed in each town to act as an intermediary between the two groups.6 While this 
obviously limited the freedom of the Maroons it also exposed them to British systems of 
law and order in a very real and practical way. Therefore, crucially for the Maroons they 
were able to navigate legal channels to preserve their freedom in the face of imperial 
encroachment.    
 Surviving in relative peace for the next fifty years after the treaty, the Maroons 
and British lived in some state of harmony. Then in 1795 the first large scale insurrection 
by Maroons since the 1739 treaty broke out in Trelawney Town. Furious over the 
treatment of two Maroons who had been found guilty of a crime and whipped by a slave, 
the Maroons saw their rights infringed upon. They saw rebellion as their only facet of 
action to protect their fervently guarded freedom. As Mike Kofhal recently argues the 
Maroons “were seeking a redress of their grievances and not contesting the terms of their 
relationship to the British Empire.”7 Thus, he sees Maroon violence as merely another 
attempt to situate themselves within a British Atlantic rather than break from it. It seems 
clear that by 1795 the Trelawney Maroons were well versed in dealing with British 
Imperial agents and understood how to situate themselves within this Imperial framework 
in order to promote their own interests. When their armed insurrection failed they were 
marked for deportation, seen as too threatening to the Island by Jamaican Governor, the 
Earl of Balcarres. 
 The rebellion itself was short lived. Starting in the summer of 1795 the Maroons, 
incensed by the public humiliation of the flogging of their men, began to show signs of 
																																																						
6 Jeffrey A. Fortin, “Blackened Beyond Our Native Hue”: Removal, Identity and the Trelawney Maroons 
on the Margins of the Atlantic World, 1796-1800” Citizenship Studies 10:1, (2006), 9. 
7 Mike Kofhal, Trelawny Maroon, the Colour of Freedom: Re-conceptualizing Subjecthood in the 
Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic. Thesis Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 2013, 7.  
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rebellion. Unwilling to take any chances Governor Balcarres sent the militia to 
Trelawney Town to prevent escalation. Balcarres himself was an American 
Revolutionary War veteran who had field experience. He also was a known hater of the 
French Revolution and saw the consequences of it unraveling in the Caribbean as one of 
the greatest threats to his rule in Jamaica.8 The Maroons for their part refused to bow 
down in the face of Balcarres aggression and burned their homes in Trelawney Town and 
moved into the jungle and mountains of the cockpit country. What followed was a few 
months of guerrilla warfare and small scale skirmishes that failed to see victory in sight 
for either side. The Maroons, however, were not fighting for total independence but more 
for the reestablishment of the status quo as it had been in 1739. That is why when 
General Walpole approached them with treaty terms, in December of 1795, that promised 
they could remain on the island they quickly agreed. Governor Balcarres ratified the 
treaty on December 28, 1795 but gave the impossibly short date of January 1, 1796 for 
the Maroons to come in and accept the treaty. With no easy lines of communication, a 
strong mistrust between the two parties, and the difficulty of traversing the terrain this 
deadline proved unattainable for most Maroons. Instead what followed was a slow trickle 
of Maroons over the coming months. Balcarres and the Jamaican Assembly decided to 
use the January 1 deadline as a hard stop though and proceeded to arrest everyone who 
came in after. The decision to deport them was made and they were boarded on ships 
sometime in April of 1796 while waiting to find out where they would go.9 
 The Maroons immediately contested the legality of this deportation by sending 
petitions to the governor. Failing to succeed in preventing their removal they were not 
																																																						
8 Fortin, “Blackened Beyond Our Native Hue,” 10. 
9 Kofahl, Colour of Freedom, 1-3.  
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totally disheartened and arrived at Halifax “expressed willingness to work for ‘Massa 
King.’”10 This willingness to work was not an abject surrender to British sovereignty but 
legal posturing11. The Jamaican Maroons were masters of engaging the British enough to 
always exist in that quasi-sovereign state that saw them maintain their autonomy while 
still allowing for them to use British legal channels. This they quickly did in Nova Scotia, 
after the winter left them desperate to leave, they once again chose legal action to voice 
their grievances. This time they left the island of their own legal impetus and headed to 
Sierra Leone, where this paper began. It is a tale of a community of Maroons existing in a 
shadow space between free and subject. Navigating not just the waters of the Atlantic but 
the legal channels of the British empire.  
 The Jamaican Maroons have received hefty scholarly attention for their bold 
resistance to British rule. First subjected to British histories written quickly after the 
rebellion the Maroons were treated as dangerous enemies. This narrative was continued 
by several late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars whose biases lay in the 
imperial camp. It was really thanks first to Mavis Campbell that the Maroons became 
more than a savage enemy for the British to battle in the whigish narrative of progress. 
Her work, spanning mostly from the 1970s to 1990s, serves to establish the Maroons as a 
historic community both worthy of study in their own right and having agency in the 
decisions made dealing with the British. The Anthropologist Kenneth Bilby, who lived 
with the Jamaican Maroons for decades, also serves as a useful insight into Maroonage 
																																																						
10 James Cleland Hamilton, The African in Canada: The Maroons of Jamaica and Nova Scotian (Toronto 
1891), 6.		
11 For more on legal posturing see Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in 
European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge University Press: NY, 2010), 24-25. Where Benton uses the 
term to describe how in a pluralistic legal tradition different groups used the law, in its reality or idea, to 
position themselves in different frameworks in order to gain an advantage.  
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through oral histories. More recent scholarship has looked at the Maroons as legal actors 
who used petitions to combat the British system. These include James Lockett, who uses 
the petitions sparingly in his surprisingly short article on deportation. Jeffery Fortin, who 
has the best examination of the use of the petitions but focuses on racial issues and fails 
to intensely integrate the documents. Finally, Mike Kofahl’s recent dissertation includes a 
useful chapter outlining the Maroon use of petitions but like Fortin fails to fully integrate 
the legal aspects and language of the documents into his argument.12 
 In order to better expose the Maroon’s use of legal posturing this paper will focus 
heavily on a textual analysis of the petitions themselves. The petitions, though often 
short, offer a wealth of detail that merits a microscopic interrogation. The hope being that 
this intense investigation will tie into many of the themes of empire, subjecthood, 
identity, and law in the British Atlantic. The Maroons petitions show a marginalized 
group who existed in a quasi-sovereign state organizing legal channels and playing on 
British identity to control their own fate.  For it was in this tepid, monster sized bath tub 
																																																						
12	Bryan Edwards, The Proceedings of the Governor and Assembly of Jamaica, In Regard to The Maroon 
Negroes: Published by Order of the Assembly. To Which is Prefixed, An Introductory Account, Containing, 
Observations on the Disposition, Character, Manners, and Habits of Life, of the Maroons, And A Detail of 
the Origin, Progress and Termination of the Late War Between Those People and the White Inhabitants, 
John Stockdale, London, 1796; R.C. Dallas, The History of the Maroons, from their Origin to the 
Establishment of their Chief Tribe at Sierra Leone: Including the Expedition to Cuba, For the Purpose of 
Procuring Spanish Chasseurs; And the State of the Island of Jamaica for the last ten years: with a Succinct 
History of the Island Previous tot that Period, Strahan, London, 1803; James Cleland Hamilton, The 
African In Canada: The Maroons of Jamaica and Nova Scotia, 1889; Douglas Brymner, The Jamaican 
Maroons how they came to Nova Scotia: how they left it, Royal Society of Canada, 1894. Orlando 
Patterson, Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the First Maroon War Jamaica, 
1655-1740. In Social and Economic Studies Vol. 19 No. 3 (Sep. 1970) 289-325; Barbara Kopytoff, 
“Jamaican Maroon Political Organization: The Effects of the Treaties,” in Social and Economic Studies, 
Vol. 25, No. 2, June 1976, 87-105; Mavis C. Campbell, The Maroons of Jamaica, 1655-1796: A History of 
Resistance, Collaboration & Betrayal, Bergin & Garvey Publishers, MA, 1988; James D. Lockett, “The 
Deportation of the Maroons of Trelawny Town to Nova Scotia, then Back to Africa,” in Journal of Black 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, Sep. 1999, 5-14; Kenneth M. Bilby, True-Born Maroons, University of Florida 
Press, FL, 2005; Jeffrey A. Fortin, “’Blackened Beyond Our Native Hues’” Removal, Identity and the 
Trelawney Maroons on the Margins of the Atlantic World, 1796-1800,” in Citizenship Studies, Vol. 10, No. 
1, 2006, 5-34; Mike Kofahl, Trelawny Maroon, The Colour of Freedom: Re-conceptualizing Subjecthood 
in the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic, Thesis Dissertation Dalhousie University 2014.  
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that the fate of the Maroons was to be decided, and these petitions prove it was not a fate 
uncontested. 
“The Maroons, to the Number of Five Hundred, surrendered themselves” in 
December of 1795 reported the Jamaican Governor, Earl of Balcarres to the London 
public in a letter published in the London Gazette.13 The rebellion of 1795 had its roots in 
the terms of the peace treaty of 1739, and concluded with a new peace established 
between acting field commander General Walpole and the Maroons. But if 1739 saw 
peace made possible for the first time between the British and Maroons than winter of 
1795 saw a different wind blowing. Desperate to rid the island of the danger of the 
“savage and ferocious Enemy,” and unable to trust in their “Sincerity,” the Maroons were 
marked for deportation.14 Removal was seen as the only way to maintain the strenuous 
slave society that proved so profitable when run efficiently. The Maroons had served a 
purpose within that slave system by acting as a police force to catch runaways. But the 
planters had grown increasingly uneasy with the Maroon presence which coupled with 
fears of French revolutionary aftershocks made removal logical to the Britons in 
Jamaica.15 The Maroons continued autonomy in Jamaica depended on the 1739 treaty and 
legal relations with Britain. Thus, law served as a double edged sword that threated at the 
same time to cut the Maroons and be used by them. Eager to resist British oppression the 
Maroons actively engaged the British legal system through petitions in order to voice 
their grievances and reclaim any lost agency from surrendering. If tragic in its outcome, 
the deportation of the Maroons of Jamaica is an incredible example of indigenous 
																																																						
13 Balcarres, London Gazette, April 23, 1796.  
14 N. Blake, London Gazette, Dec. 22, 1795; Balcarres, London Gazette, April 23, 1796. 
15 Jeffrey A. Fortin, “’Blackened Beyond Our Native Hues’: Removal, Identity and the Trelawney Maroons 
on the Margins of the Atlantic World, 1796-1800,” Citizenship Studies, 10:1, 2006, 10-11.		
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populations exploiting the legal system of a colonizing power in order to navigate the 
murky waters of empire.  
 The question of how to handle the Maroons was left suspended for only a few 
short months. A time when many Maroons were still surrendering themselves under the 
auspices of the treaties stipulations that included being promised by General Walpole 
they would be safe from removal.16 By April 20, 1796 the Maroons were dealt a shocking 
blow when the Assembly recommended deportation for those “who surrendered after the 
first of January.”17 The rebellion had failed is the usual story. But a more nefarious, and 
honest, reading suggests that the rebellion itself succeeded. The treaty, like in 1739 was 
made much more between equally desperate parties for peace than a dominant Britain. 
The Maroons surrender was beneficial to the British in terms of safely resuming their 
hugely profitable exploitation of slave labor for the empire on the island. In fact, the 
British were spared huge amounts of manpower and the accompanying cost by the 
Maroons surrender. General Walpole estimating “treble the number of troops would not 
have brought in so many marrons in twelve months” as the treaty did.18 If the rebellion 
succeeded, in the sense it forced some resumption of the status quo pre bellum it failed 
miserably in being upheld. This failure to adhere to the treaty led to countless legal 
debates and petitions spanning three continents. For the Maroons were versed in British 
law beyond just the terms of surrender. The petition replaced the musket in their battle for 
autonomy in the British empire.  
 The first Maroon petition was sent directly to Governor Balcarres on April 27, 
1796. The petition is subdued and humble. Addressing the governor as “His Honor, the 
																																																						
16 Kofahl, Colour of Freedom, 3.  
17 Anon, Proceedings of the Governor and Assembly of Jamaica, London, 1796, 100. 
18 Ibid, 87.		
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Earl of Balcarres” the Maroons clearly understand the proper formalities to avoid offense. 
This point, obvious to any European or Creole, is important to understanding the legal 
aptitude of the Maroons. They were free blacks who existed in a quasi-autonomous space 
in Jamaica that saw them brush up with British law and these petitions would be their 
first real legal battleground. Therefore, the simple formalities of language cannot be 
overlooked as expected but should be seen as deeply profound. For the Maroons, a 
powerful warrior culture who “were a people jealous of their liberty” the ability to 
suspend claims to total freedom in order to seek legal redress was a major undertaking.19 
The Earl of Balcarres became the great enemy of the Maroons, a ghost haunting their 
dreams, but in the face of deportation they were willing to engage him as their only hope 
of avoiding removal. 
 To this end the Maroons next brought up the fact that Balcarres in his “Great 
Goodness and Marcy rati[fied] the acceptance of certain Proposals” made by the 
Maroons.20 This refers to the fact that Balcarres originally agreed to the terms settled by 
the Maroon leader, Colonel Montague James, and General Walpole. By bringing up the 
original stipulations of the 1795 treaty, and even more importantly Balcarres acceptance 
of its terms, the Maroons offered a subtle, but firm, reminder of the breach of trust 
Balcarres would be complicit in by deporting them. A breach he would become all too 
familiar with after the fact when he often found the need to defend his actions.21  
The Maroons, however quickly tempered this statement by admitting they were 
																																																						
19 George Walpole, House of Commons, May 1, 1796, in Mavis Campbell Nova Scotia and the Fighting 
Maroons: A Documentary History, 267.  *** Maybe a discussion of masculinity if I can find sources? Or 
warrior culture? Tie into submission essay I already wrote?  
20 Maroon Petition to Balcarres. 27th April 1796: C.O. 137/96 in Campbell Fighting Maroons, 3.  
21 As proven by the work of Bryan Edwards written in 1796 that is clearly a defense of Balcarres and the 
Assembly’s decision to deport the Maroons.  
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“conscious how much they have offended” the British and how they feared staying on the 
“Island might be attended with fatal Consequences to themselves and Families.”22 This 
statement has three important points: first, it admits the Maroons have done something 
wrong, second, it addresses the idea of removal as a safety precaution and while failing to 
endorse deportation acknowledges one of the British justifications for it, finally, it brings 
up Maroon families as a key aspect beyond just the warrior men. The admittance of 
wrong doing is done in intentionally vague language. The message panders to the British 
desire to be vindicated as the moral and correct party but the Maroons really only admit 
to how they have “offended” the British. In this sense they are allowing for the British 
perception of their actions without officially endorsing the British position itself. In this 
way they are able to accept responsibility through British eyes, which makes their 
petition more effective, but not actually admit explicitly anything they have done is 
wrong.  
As to removal the Maroons continue by asking to be moved to any other part of  
“his Majestys Dominions” so they might “obtain an opportunity of proving he Sincerity 
of their Repentance.”23 Removal, therefore, is not outright accepted by the Maroons. This 
petitions real goal was to keep the Jamaican Maroons on the island. The Maroons, 
however, were aware of the difficulties of their position and made use of the petition to 
also present an alternative if removal became inevitable. By staying within the empire the 
Maroons could maintain their connections to Britain and importantly to its legal code. 
This proved extremely beneficial later in Nova Scotia where the Maroon were able to 
continue their process of legal posturing through petition in order to secure transportation 
																																																						
22 Maroon Petition to Balcarres, 3. 	
23 Ibid.  
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to Sierra Leone. In order to exploit these legal channels, the Maroons needed to have 
established relationships and understandings of the working of the laws, both of which 
they possessed with the British. Not to mention a shared language. That is why they were 
“anxious…to prove themselves faithful subjects.”24  
 The mention of their families serves as a reminder that this deportation was not 
just of fighting men but of an entire community. In fact, of the “568[Maroons], of whom 
only 167 were arms-bearing men, the remaining 401, being women, children and the 
aged.”25 A whole society was being removed then not just the warriors. The cause of 
deportation was the rebellion but the aftershocks expanded beyond the purely military. 
By including their families in the petition the Maroons reminded Balcarres of the cost of 
this removal and the fact that he was punishing women and children as well. That not all 
Maroons were armed and dangerous and that many needed protection. Protection became 
an even more important aspect later in the petitions sent from Nova Scotia. 
 The petition ends with the Maroons “humbly” asking for Balcarres to “take their 
Melancholy Situation into Consideration” and offer them “relief.”26 The Maroons style 
themselves as victims needing help from the British. In this sense, they are launching a 
propaganda campaign to make their cause sympathetic rather than dangerous. They are 
“melancholy” rather than “savage” in their own explanation. The British offer the 
solution to that sadness by offering “relief” from the fear of deportation. Never mind the 
messy reality that both parties realize the Maroons only face deportation because of 
rather duplicitous decisions by the Governor and Assembly of Jamaica. Both parties were 
aware of this but the Maroons were clever enough to avoid whining about the state of 
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their deportation. Instead they use legal channels to present the best case they can by 
making themselves sympathetic law abiders instead who were sorry for “offending” the 
British.  
 The petition is then signed by the Maroons to grant it legal status. The 
components of the signature are worth studying because they reveal the codependent 
nature of the Maroons and British relationship since the 1739 treaty. First, the Maroons 
names are Anglo suggesting that they understand the power of othering. Even beyond the 
petition itself by using Anglo names the Maroons were supplanting themselves into a 
British system of identity that included access to the law. They, at least on paper, became 
indistinguishable from any other “James Lawrence” or “John Simpson.” Second, the 
Maroons added their ranks alongside their marks as well. The ranks were also associated 
with the British army and may, in some cases, have been direct reflections of their 
military service to the British. Even if they were assumed titles rather than given the 
manner of organization was clearly built upon the British system. Just like the Anglo 
names the military ranks created the sense that the Maroons were just as deserving of 
attention as any other subject in the empire. In fact, the ranks make them even more 
valuable, if an empires concerns can be judged on such a value system than military 
service was essential. By including ranks the Maroons were showcasing their martial 
prowess as a people in the abstract but in the very literal sense were reminding the British 
of their role as slave captors and militia defending the island. The Maroons presented 
themselves in this petition as essential members of the empire that were 
indistinguishable, on paper at least, from any other British subject.27 
 The first petition failed to secure the freedom of the Maroons. Instead they were 
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left aboard the ships in the harbor bobbing with the sea in anticipation of their journey, 
but without knowing where that trip would lead them. This was because the British 
themselves were struggling to determine where the Maroons would be sent. Unwilling to 
sit idly by the Maroons once again petitioned on their own behalf. This time they went 
over Balcarres head and addressed their claims to the Duke of Portland, who had been 
Prime Minister in 1783 and in 1795 was Secretary of the Colonies.28 This petition had 
several overlaps with the first but was not entirely a repeat. In fact, there were some large 
changes worth mentioning. The most startling being the juxtaposition of offering military 
service but dropping their ranks in the signature section.  
 The petition starts less formally than the first because it doesn’t immediately draw 
attention to its nature.29 Instead the Maroons enact a subtle change by starting with the 
flowery language meant to flatter, and thus make more amiable, the Duke. While this 
flattery is obviously expected as discussed earlier its constant usage and primacy of place 
in this petition made it important. Even more relevant was the relationship of the parties 
involved. The Maroons were free, but black, and the Duke is not only white, but also, a 
titled noble. The power relations obviously demand such language but that’s what makes 
it so meaningful that the Maroons engage so easily and often in flattery. They were aware 
that humans, unlike laws, were not coded and set in place but movable. That humans 
have emotions like pride and desires and that through engaging in simple flattery and 
proper letter conduct the Maroons help their cause. Not just simply by buttering the Duke 
up but also by showing their understanding of the nature of petitions and British power 
relations. They are playing the part, acting the story the British expect, but not entirely of 
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black to white relations as Fortin suggests but of Britons themselves. The Maroons are 
even more in the middle than Fortin realizes, they aren’t just sandwiched between black 
and white society they are actively moving from one to the other in order to facilitate 
their needs. By inhabiting the tropes of each race, or region, the Maroons are able to 
manipulate the audience of their petition to view them favorably.  
 To this end the petition begins with “May it please your Lordship” but the second 
part is even more important because the petition is being lodged on “behalf of ourselves 
and families.”30 This turn of phrase serves to engender gender expectations of the British 
into the petition. The only people who signed the first petition, and this one as well, were 
men. Thus, “ourselves” refers to the signers of the petition but broadly refers to all the 
men of fighting age in the Maroons. The leaders of the community and the leaders of the 
rebellion were linked in their marital status. Therefore, masculinity was key to their 
identity but some suggest that there was a larger degree of equality among their family 
norms than in Europe.31 Which makes it all the more important that the fighting men 
were mentioned first because it establishes their role as patriarchal and protective figures. 
Then the family was mentioned because as fighting men their greatest concern is the 
protection of their families. This invocation of traditional British values of the family was 
important because it once again makes the Maroons seem less different. They are united 
in their family identity. Even if this ordering was not a long thought out process it hints at 
the subconscious assumptions the Maroons have of British society and how to manipulate 
it in order to get their legal aims.  
 In fact, the Maroon petitions by and large avoid heavy legal language or calls to 
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established precedents. The intricacy of the law itself is not what is really important to 
them. Rather, the way the law offers an avenue to acquire their aims make it a useful tool. 
Their appeal to law then is on the pragmatism that legal answers will help them where 
martial prowess failed them. The manipulation in the petitions then is not so much 
directly of the laws themselves but the people and society that made them. The Maroons 
are legal actors because they use petitions and the law to fight, or promote, their 
movement within the British empire. But the law is simply the manner of achieving this 
goal while the actual handling of the law is minute. It is by presenting themselves as 
capable and useful subjects, and even more so as subjects recognizable to the average 
Briton by things like language, names, ranks, and family values that the Maroons use 
petitions to promote themselves as legal actors.  
 The Maroons understand this idea of subjecthood very well too. The appeal is sent 
to the Duke of Portland, but as he was “representing our King his most Excellent Majesty 
George the Third.”32 In a way, the petition was then meant for King George III, or at least 
recognized him as the top of the imperial hierarchy the Maroons were appealing to. 
Critically and tellingly they refer to him as “our King” and thus situate their claim within 
this hierarchy instead of without it. They were not just an indigenous population in 
contact with the British petitioning for their concerns. They were much more, they were 
subjects, they were within the same framework as any other Briton who saw George III 
as “our King.” By maneuvering themselves into this hierarchy they unlocked the legal 
doors necessary to make their petition meaningful. By becoming subjects, they were 
forced to submit to certain aspects of the British ‘civilizing’ mission but also gained the 
rights of those subjects. In this way the Maroons continue their practice of spatially 
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maneuvering between different conceptions of identity. Wearing whatever hat best suited 
their purpose. As the rest of the petition demonstrate their current situation in Jamaica on 
the eve of deportation demanded they use flattery and posture themselves as British 
subjects in order to access the law for their needs.  
 Though only a few weeks separates the petitions on the ground the situation had 
changed dramatically. This is evident when the Maroons say “being sensible that our stay 
in this Island is impossible from the resentment shewn against us by the whites and 
people of colour.”33 The first petition had mentioned the idea of being settled in a 
different part of the empire in order to prove themselves worthy but still hoped this 
wouldn’t be necessary and that the Maroons could stay in Jamaica. The second petition 
sees this is an impossible desire. The “Legislature has declared it a Capital crime for us to 
reland in Jamaica” the Maroons lament.34 The Maroons identify why the legislature 
thought this necessary because everyone on the island wanted them gone. The Maroons 
ability to drift between the different societies proved to be their downfall in this case. The 
whites resented them because they rebelled and were seen as a danger to the stability of 
the institution of slavery in Jamaica. Meanwhile, ironically, slaves hated them because of 
their complicity in maintaining the very institution of slavery per the conditions of the 
1739 treaty that saw the Maroons acting as slave hunters. Therefore, the Maroons 
recognized they were fighting a losing battle to delay their removal. But they didn’t 
surrender to their impending fate but continued to actively use legal channels to influence 
their fate as much as possible.  
 Unable to remain in Jamaica the Maroons pleaded for the Duke of Portland to 
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“settle us in any Country under His Majestys Government.”35 This echoes their request 
made in the first petition but there it was a secondary plan while now it was their goal. It 
is worth thinking about why the Maroons were so desperate to stay within British rule 
when the British were the very ones deporting them. Especially at a time when Haiti was 
locked in a bitter war fought by slaves for their freedom from another Europeans power. 
The answer lies in two considerations; first, the Maroons were not slaves and thus had no 
need to fight for their freedom. The rebellion they had just launched in 1795 was never 
about taking Jamaica over from the British it was about maintaining their sovereignty and 
privileged status as detailed in the 1739 treaty. The Maroons saw themselves as above all 
other blacks on the Island enslaved and free.36 Therefore moving to a country like Haiti, 
where the revolution had not yet succeeded, or any other place threatened their privileged 
status. Secondly, the Maroons had a century and a half of contact with the British and 
over fifty years had passed since the 1739 treaty. They were intimately familiar with their 
customs, language, military, culture, and law. The most pragmatic way to survive 
deportation as a community was to do so in a framework they understood and could 
manipulate. While no indication survives to suggest the Maroons were planning to 
petition for removal as soon as they arrived in Nova Scotia regardless of the weather or 
governor this action only became possible because the Maroons knew how to operate 
within the British empire. In order to protect themselves as much as possible as a 
community and their futures the Maroons saw staying inside the British empire as 
essential.  
 Just as the first petition meant to keep the Maroons in Jamaica but offered the 
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alternative option of staying within the empire the second petition also offers another 
solution to the Maroons plight. Failing to stay within the empire the Maroons ask that the 
men be allowed to “serve His Majesty as Soldiers” while their “old Men and Women our 
Wives and Children…may receive such protection and support from Government as may 
enable them to live comfortably.”37 This request plays on the gender expectations of 
masculinity that sees men as being defined by their martial prowess. This soldiering is 
even more impressive because it is in service to the King and also a sacrifice so that the 
Maroons who can’t fight, the elderly and women and children, may live better lives.  
 The Maroons tie this idea of service, mentioned in the first petition as well, into 
military service and protection of the family. Service also has the function of legitimizing 
their place within the British system. The Maroons can only lay claim to British legal 
action if they can successfully portray themselves as subjects who are guaranteed by right 
access to the law. This was a difficult enough task given the color of their skin but not 
impossible. It is, however, made even more daunting by the fact that the reason for their 
deportation, and subsequent use of petitions, was due to their rebellion. The solution the 
Maroons find was when they say they will be soldiers to “defend and protect the same as 
dutyfull and loyal subjects.”38 They directly tie the concepts of loyalty and subjecthood to 
military service. Quite literally this means they see a direct link between being a subject 
and being a soldier. That in order to secure subjecthood one must be willing to serve as a 
soldier. By offering to do this the Maroons are positioning themselves to be understood 
as subjects. But not just regular subjects, loyal ones as well. Doubly important given the 
state of their recent rebellion. The Maroons masterfully recognize military service as a 
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means to prove their loyalty. They transition the view of them as rebellious, and thus a 
military threat, into subjects, and a military advantage. 
 The Maroon petition concludes with them hoping for a quick reply, which 
highlights their urgent needs as they are literally on the ships awaiting deportation, and 
how this will give them “grateful satisfaction to know that our humble services are 
acceptable.”39 They highlight their precarious situation on the ground and the need for 
swift action in order to rescue them from some horrible fate. This reminds the reader, 
much like the mention of women and children, of the actual human cost of the 
deportation. It appeals to their sympathy and highlights the anxiety of the Maroons who 
can see the hourglass running low of sand. But even in that anxiety they remember, and 
intentionally so, to use stately language that recognizes the seriousness of the petition, 
and thus British law, as well as the status of the Duke of Portland in relation to the 
Maroons. The phrase “humble services” also has a flexible timeline that suggests a future 
and remembers a past. The future service is the military capabilities the Maroons offer to 
use in order to secure the comfort of their families. The past being all the evidence the 
British need to know that the Maroons have that martial ability as they first forced the 
British to treat with the in 1739 and then worked with them to capture runaway slaves 
and protect the Island until 1795. Thus, the word “services” is reminding the British of 
the value of the Maroons. They understand that the British might be moved by sympathy, 
and certainly make use of this, but at the end of the day the empire is pragmatic and 
expensive. For the Maroons to be worthy subjects they must be useful subjects. The 
Maroons define their use in their military service to the empire, past and future.  
 The only confusion in the petition to this end was that the Maroons didn’t sign 
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with their ranks. It seems logical that in order to press the point home of their past and 
future utility as soldiers including British ranks they had acquired would only help. 
Campbell suggests that perhaps they were well known enough by this time to not need 
the ranks or their last names.40 But this is unsatisfactory for many reasons, mostly, 
because it contradicts their military prowess and their careful use of etiquette and flattery. 
A more likely explanation is the Maroon’s were straddling the need to press their ability 
to prove their loyalty through military service along with humbling themselves in front of 
the Duke of Portland. Avoiding using ranks that would remind him of their betrayal in 
their rebellion they offer military service as future proof of loyalty instead.   
 The Maroon petitions met with little reflection from Balcarres who was 
determined from the start to remove them. Several locations were discussed though and 
Nova Scotia may have been chosen due to the black loyalists being sent there after the 
American Revolution but also in response to the Maroon petitions.41 Nova Scotia, after 
all was well within the empire. So it was that nearly 600 Maroons were shipped, against 
their will, to Nova Scotia as punishment for their rebellion. It is impossible to escape the 
foil with other penal colonies that survived off the forced import of labor from various 
parts of the empire. What is remarkable about the Maroon removal then, is not so much 
that they were deported, but that they were not enslaved or even jailed and put under 
labor contracts upon arrival in Nova Scotia. So much more surprising given that they 
were blacks in a white empire. The best explanation lies in their long status of working 
with the British since the 1739 treaty. Then in the petitions they worked hard to show that 
even after rebelling they were loyal subjects. They were desperate to prove their worth 
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once again and by doing so maintain their rights within the imperial framework. This 
crafty play by the Maroons distanced themselves from prisoners who were seen as a 
detriment to society and whose labor was forced as a condition of their penance. The 
Maroons flipped this and offered their labor as proof of their loyalty and thereby 
maintained their role as subjects of the empire who were deserving of rights. This 
posturing would prove crucial in the coming years in Nova Scotia where the Maroons 
once again took to petitions in order to affect their fate.  
 The Maroons arrived in Nova Scotia and were eagerly met by Governor 
Wentworth. He saw them as a happy challenge. A people to be guided by the civilizing 
principles of the British realm through education and religion.42 The Maroons were 
willing to comply to an extent in order to prove their loyalty but where not entirely 
willing to abandon their customs. Especially when it came to religion, only a few were 
willing to convert to Christianity, and they moved to a separate settlement at Bodyville.43 
The petitions represent a legal channel accessed by Maroons operating within the British 
imperial system. The words they used had power and certainly generated images and 
arguments that proved useful for them in posturing for the ability to decide where they 
would live. But the petitions alone were not enough and life also was a reflection of their 
loyalty, the petitions therefore served at once as a promise of future loyalty and a 
reminder of past service. Thus, upon arrival in Nova Scotia the Maroons were settled 
close to Halifax and immediately set to work building defenses in case of French attack.44 
The Maroons were able to make use of their greatest claim to relevance within the 
empire, their military prowess. They had offered to serve in their petitions sent while in 
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Jamaica and were quickly put to use, without the musket but still using the shovel as a 
tool to entrench their loyalty as subjects to the Crown.  
 Early on it seemed as if the move to Nova Scotia stood a chance of success. The 
Maroons were eager to prove themselves loyal subjects and the opportunity arose through 
military fortification projects. They were also accepting of many of Governor 
Wentworth’s early designs to “civilize” them. The situation quickly changed though, 
starting with the worst winter on record in Nova Scotia at the time.45 This coupled with 
growing tension between the Governor and the Maroons led the Maroons to seek a 
solution. The one they came up with was once again the petition. A serious of petitions 
were sent from the Maroons in the few years they were in Nova Scotia as they 
desperately sought relocation. Unlike the petitions in Jamaica they were not fighting to 
stay but to go. The Maroons had also learned from their failure in Jamaica and didn’t rely 
on the Governor to save them. They sent many petitions straight to England, often 
through General Walpole, in order to seek legal solutions to their issues from the highest 
court possible.  
 The Maroons realized after their failure in Jamaica that sending their petitions 
directly was not working well enough. To fix this they began to use white intermediaries 
in England, specifically General Walpole who was still smarting over the dishonor done 
to him by the Jamaican Assembly when they ignored his word and deported the Maroons. 
By using a high profile and well connected white politician as a spokesperson for their 
cause the Maroons were better able to advance their cause. In this way their petitions 
eventually made it to the House of Commons, the King’s Ministers, and through them 
likely the King himself. The Maroons were well aware they could not hope to be heard at 
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these levels without connections and were willing to enter into a sort of client-patron 
relationship with General Walpole in order to secure what was best for them. General 
Walpole for his side, not purely motivated by love for the Maroons, was a prideful man 
who saw an opportunity to further his personal glory by representing these people and 
restoring his word that was damaged by Balcarres and the Assembly’s betrayal.46 
 The Maroons too felt betrayed once in Nova Scotia because the climate, both of 
nature and man, was not to their liking. So it was that in April of 1797, not even a full 
year since their arrival in Nova Scotia, the Maroons were petitioning to General Walpole. 
They expressed their “confidence” in him and decried the “late unhappy war” and how 
they had surrendered to him on the promise of not just “sparing our Lives but our not 
being removed from the Country.”47 In this way they continued in their tradition of 
humbling themselves in their petitions in order to promote the importance of those they 
sought help from and show themselves as loyal subjects who knew their place. But, they 
did so with a barb this time, reminding Walpole that he had promised they would remain 
on the island. The petition was sent from Halifax, thousands of miles away from the 
comfort of the cockpits of Jamaica, where they had once lived. In this way the Maroons 
manipulate Walpole by extolling their confidence in him and then again by reminding 
him of his broken promise. They continue this double approach by soliciting his 
“goodness” and appealing to his power by saying they “doubt not its [the petition] 
success if aided by your kind interference.”48 They wanted the petition to be presented to 
“His Majesty’s Minister,” the lack of a name potentially suggesting Maroon ignorance of 
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the actual person they needed to send the petition to. 49  This highlights, rather than 
detracts, from Maroon intelligence in legal posturing. They were well aware of their 
limitations in reaching the necessary channels in the metropole and thus exploited 
Walpole as their agent in these matters.   
 Walpole was not a random choice either. He was the General who was 
responsible for ending the rebellion and most importantly conducting the peace 
negotiations. His secret promise was an important link between himself and the Maroons 
because it served as a point of betrayal to both of them. But what really made Walpole 
important to the Maroons was his position was seen as legitimate. He was the head field 
commander during operations when the rebellion ended in December 1795. He was in 
charge when the peace treaty was signed, it was ratified by Balcarres, but it was 
negotiated and agreed on between the Maroon leader Montague James and General 
Walpole. To the Maroons then, Walpole was not just any white representative who could 
help them he was one who held legitimacy in their eyes because of his role in the 
rebellion. Walpole, for his part refused the money awarded him by the assembly to buy a 
celebratory sword and resigned his positon to return to London and seek political office 
he was so disgusted by their betrayal of his promise.50 
Again, appealing to him was a logical decision that had legitimate legal reasoning 
behind it. Hardly a white savoir of blacks, Walpole had his own diverse history in terms 
of treatment of blacks. He was a known opponent to certain abolitionist thinkers and had 
even suggested a plan to get the Maroons addicted to alcohol to make them useless.51 
Walpole was clearly motivated by a deep seated resentment for his own personal 
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treatment in Jamaica by the Governor and Assembly. To him, his honor, rather than the 
Maroons themselves were at stake. But the Maroons had little need to care about his 
motivations as they were desperate to push their cause through legal channels. While in 
the colonies they could directly access the government, as seen in their writing of 
petitions first to Governor Balcarres in Jamaica and then Wentworth in Nova Scotia, they 
didn’t have that access in the metropole. Walpole was their answer, and the two parties 
developed a mutually beneficial client-patron relationship. Walpole would restore his 
honor and the Maroons would have their petitions heard due to his political role in the 
metropole.  
The Maroons had proved in Jamaica that they felt no allegiance to only one path 
for their petitions, in 1796 they had first directed their request to Balcarres and then 
failing to the Duke of Portland. Again in November of 1797, having already written 
Walpole and eager to get as much aid as possible, the Maroons sent a petition to the Duke 
of Portland. Opening with their standard tactic of elevating the person they were 
addressing while degrading themselves they express it was with “heartfelt distress we 
presume to trouble you.”52 They continue by calling themselves “Poor distressed 
Maroons” who were asking for “Your Grace to use your influence to endeavour” on their 
part.53 They use the flowery title of your Grace to elevate the Duke while describing 
themselves as poor and distressed. By creating such drastic foils, they position 
themselves as in need of help and only a respected, noble, white man can save them. In 
this regard they are playing on the racial tropes that Fortin identifies in his article.54 The 
racial aspect while clearly intentionally and intelligent was only one stratagem in the 
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Maroon wheelhouse. It was their overall ability to manipulate the legal channels and find 
workarounds, like white representatives, when they can’t find direct access that 
eventually make the Maroon’s petitions successful. The petition goes on to cite the 
cruelty of living in such in such a cold place that “deprived some of us of existence.”55  
What really stands out about this petition though, separating it from previous 
examples, is the Maroons directly challenge the authority of other respected whites. In 
this case they directly attack Governor Wentworth saying that “whatever information that 
has been received” by him “is so far void of truth, that the very idea of it makes us 
shudder.”56 This is a dangerous, but calculated, move by the Maroons who typically 
acknowledge their own wrong doings. By standing up to the Governor the Maroons are 
insisting only their version of events was true. They were demanding the power to speak 
for themselves. That only Maroon voices could represent Maroon feelings. This very bold 
decree was immediately tempered by the Maroons asking Portland “most humbly most 
submissively” to help get them removed to a better climate.57 By ending the petition by 
reminding Portland they were humble and submissive the Maroons reinforce that they 
were still loyal subjects. They were demanding their own voice but still within an 
imperial framework not outside of it.  
The Maroons found success in this use of white representatives and were able to 
address a petition to “His Majestys Ministers” sent August 12, 1797. This petition was 
very short and expressed many of the ideas expanded on in the petition to Portland sent in 
November. There was a chance this petition was sent to Portland as the one the Maroons 
asked Portland to present to the King’s Ministers. It uses the same official language 
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calling themselves “Humble Petitioners” but removes much of the excess flowery 
statements of flattery. This could be due to the audience being the ministers and not an 
individual the Maroons are intimately familiar with. They were using short and 
bureaucratic procedure rather than personal flattery to position this letter. It, like the one 
to Portland, was bold though by claiming that Wentworth’s reports were “so far from the 
truth.”58 The Maroons, therefore, were not only making these claims in personal 
correspondence but at a government agent. They were not willing to back down and let 
the Governor speak for them but demanded their own voice was heard. Only by inserting 
themselves as their owns spokesperson could their petitions be met seriously and 
successfully. This marked difference from their more docile attempts in Jamaica could 
help explain their success while in Nova Scotia. First, by better employing white agents 
as representatives for them in the metropole and then by demanding only their words 
could be accepted as evidence of their condition.  
General Walpole also introduced a petition to the House of Commons on March 
5, 1798 on behalf of the Maroons. This shows that he was also eager to perform his 
function within their relationship and took seriously his role as mediator of Maroon 
claims. The petition was even called into question by Secretary Dundas who challenged 
its authority by showing it was addressed to Walpole himself and not properly to the 
King or his ministers. Walpole quickly blamed this on Maroon “ignorance” and was able 
to convince the House to accept the legitimacy of the petition.59 This appeal to Maroon 
ignorance parallels the appeals the Maroons themselves make in many of their petitions. 
The irony being that far from ignorant the Maroons were using this trope of stupidity in 
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order to posture themselves as in need of help.  
An undated petition addressed to the House of Commons could be this petition 
Walpole brought up on behalf of the Maroons. The petition opens as is customary with 
the Maroons asking the “Honorable the House of Commons of Great Britain” to listen to 
their “most humbly” presented petition.60 This petition though is longer than most 
previous ones and serves as brief chronology of the Maroons relations with Britain 
through petitions. The “wretched Petitioners are Maroon Exiles” and they admit that this 
is “just in some degree” but that they have suffered too much and have been represented 
to “blacken the Maroons beyond his native hue.”61 The Maroons thus follow their new 
strategy since arriving in Nova Scotia which is a combination of the humility they used in 
Jamaica but also a sternness in insisting on representing themselves and a willingness to 
challenge white British representations of them. Even their removal they acknowledge 
was just, in some ways, in order to prove their continued loyalty and acceptance of 
British law. After all, if they didn’t accept their deportation as legal how could they hope 
to use petitions as a method of legal posturing. It would have been far more difficult to 
directly challenge the legality of their removal in the face of their rebellion. Therefore, 
they accept it as just, some degree relaying their bitterness at Walpole’s promise that 
Balcarres ignored, in order to access British legal channels as proven loyal subjects.  
The Maroons, then echoing Walpole’s comments when questioned by Dundas, 
point out their “ignorance” at addressing so “venerable, and so August a Body as the 
Commons of Great Britain.”62 By calling attention to their own ignorance the Maroons 
situate themselves as awkward members of the British legal system. People who have 
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access to it, but don’t fully understand how to use it. This, no doubt, was the 
understanding already apparent to Britain’s in the metropole who saw the Maroons as the 
“wretched” people they eagerly represented themselves as. This was not ignorance on the 
Maroons part though but intelligence to first know their limits and second how to 
overcome them. The Maroons further promote the esteem in which they hold this august 
body by saying they understand that issues of “greater magnitude engross their 
Attention.”63 But even so the Maroons with “the profoundest respect and Submission” 
petition the House in order to “beg leave” to say that the Maroon will never “thrive where 
the Pine Apple does not.”64 Here the Maroons use a metaphor for the first time in order to 
convey in a more literary, and thus esteemed, style their inability to survive in Nova 
Scotia. They were desperate for removal and had been using different agents and 
petitions to achieve this goal and finally they have access to the House of Commons. 
Their use of Pine Apples then was not purely hyperbolic symbolism but a rational plea 
based on literary metaphor to express their desired home land. A home land they now 
saw as Africa, not Jamaica, and certainly not Nova Scotia.  
 Sierra Leone became the mutually beneficial object of the Maroons and British 
agent’s desires. It was a chartered colony in need of colonists. It had already received 
many of the Black loyalists from the Revolution but they were acting out. As the Ross 
Diary entry that started this paper proved the British were looking for a sort of police 
force to help calm the colony down. Recalling the maroon promise of loyalty through 
military might the British saw the Maroons as that force. The Maroons, for their part, 
were eager for warmer climate within the Empire and couldn’t object to Sierra Leone. 
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The British, no doubt, saw it, or at least presented it, as altruistic in their returning Blacks 
once enslaved to Africa. So Sierra Leone became the destination of Maroon removal but 
the very fact of their removal was still to be contested.65 
In order to drive the point home of their existence in Nova Scotia as unnatural 
they argued that “such Incongruities and such Antipathies do not exist either in the moral 
or Physical World.”66 Fortin is right to use this petition as a key bit of evidence in arguing 
for the Maroon use of racial tropes to posture their legal claims but fails to accept the 
other unnatural claim, the moral world.67 The Maroons have, since Jamaica, worked ideas 
of morality into their petitions. They have expressed sorrow at their revolt and devotion 
to proving their loyalty through military service. Morality to them is evident in the 
betrayal they felt about Walpole’s promise. Morality is there when they demand only 
they can speak for themselves as Governor Wentworth is presenting lies about their 
conditions and happiness. The Maroons clearly value the idea, as abstract as it can be 
taken here, of morality and believe the British House of Commons will as well. By 
appealing to this sense of moral justification the Maroons call upon the British to help the 
Maroons. And by earlier pleading their ignorance of the legal system and throughout their 
petitions begging humbly and calling themselves wretched the Maroons have positioned 
themselves as in need of British legal protection. The law in this sense was supposed to 
uphold the morality. Thus, the Maroon existence in Nova Scotia is immoral and must be 
corrected as well as unnatural as based on racial theory.  
The Maroons further sell this idea of morality and its connection to law and 
justice by claiming they have sent this petition to the House of Commons because 
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parliament is “the Seat, Fountain head, of Law, Equity, and Justice, whence they humbly 
trust soon to find Relief.”68  In this way the Maroons directly link their plea for removal 
to justice. The means of accomplishing this, law, for what could be more just than that? 
Much like when they reminded Walpole of his need to help them for failing to keep his 
promise the Maroons also remind the House of Commons of their duty to uphold justice 
through the law. The Maroons turn to another literary flourish to completely drive home 
their point claiming that their first wish is “Removal from Nova Scotia” to any place 
more “congenial to their natures” but failing this they prefer “Death in its most awful 
shapes” to having to live another day in what they later call the “Wilds of Nova Scotia.”69 
Thus, the Maroons are petitioning for moral justice as executed through the law or would 
rather die. In this way they fully throw their fate into the hands of the House of Commons 
to protect them. Protection, through legal posturing, being more effective than armed 
resistance that first got them into this situation. The 1795 rebellion in this light saw the 
Maroons become more, rather than less, invested in the British empire.  
The Maroons change in tactics and abundance of petitions paid off when on 
August 3, 1800 some five hundred Maroons boarded the Asia for Sierra Leone. Sierra 
Leone was eventually agreed upon as the destination to satisfy the Maroon need for 
warmer climate and the British need for military personal. Thus, militarism, a theme 
played on greatly by the Maroons in their petitions in Jamaica that had faded in their calls 
for justice in Nova Scotia resurfaced as a prime link between the Maroons and British. 
Ever since the 1739 treaty the Maroons relationship to the British had been defined in 
quasi-sovereign and militaristic terms. Ironically it was through military terms, or 
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rebellion, this link was damaged. It was then through legal channels, also opened up by 
the 1739 treaty, that the Maroons were able to navigate their situation and decide their 
own fate. Playing many different cards at once the Maroon use of petitions was ranging 
in many ways. Characterized in Jamaica mostly by appealing to military utility and the 
idea of loyalty the Maroons attempted to negotiate first their staying in Jamaica and 
failing that their staying in the empire. Failing to prevent deportation and quickly coming 
to hate Nova Scotia for its weather and overbearing Governor, the Maroons adopted a 
slightly different strategy. They appealed to a wider audience and fully endorsed using 
white agents in London to promote their goals, namely the distressed General Walpole 
who was seeking to honor his word. The Maroons also began to demand only their voice 
could speak for their woes and went as far as calling the reports sent by Wentworth and 
his agents downright lies. Finally, the Maroons maintained their appeals of loyalty to the 
Crown as good subjects but abandoned the talk of military and family so central to their 
Jamaican petitions. Instead, as Fortin deals with, they turned to racial stereotypes, but 
also moral ones in order to make themselves look like “wretched petitioners” in need of 
British protection. In this light the Maroons finally won their petitions and were removed 
to Sierra Leone where they acted as a police force for colonial agents. Thus, the military 
loyalty of the Maroons was once again on display as the two parties worked to exploit 
each other as much as possible. In this light though the Maroons were not defenseless 
subalterns totally taken advantage of by the British. Certainly the power structures were 
not equal and people like Governor Balcarres moved quickly to exploit this fact. But the 
Maroons were a fierce and proud people, but often renowned for this and their militaristic 
traditions, they were also incredibly smart. Making use of legal channels opened up to 
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them through the 1739 treaty the Maroons adopted the role of loyal British subjects in 
order to manipulate the system and legally posture for their best outcome. In this way the 
Maroons exercised incredible agency within an Imperial framework that held all the cards 
against them.  
These petitions are clearly thought out pieces of legal writing and must be 
understood as such. It would be a grave mistake to attribute any aspects to luck because 
the Maroons were well aware of how their words would resonate with a British audience. 
They were desperate in their desire to use legal channels to avoid deportation but were 
not foolish in how they mobilized these channels. They clearly and rationally presented 
their arguments in order to achieve the best possible outcome for themselves.  
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Sic Semper Tyrannis: Catiline and Caesar in Early American Insults, Allusions, and 
The Whiskey Rebellion, 1789-1804. 
 
The sun was just breaking on the dawn on July 11, 1804 when a single bullet 
ripped into Alexander Hamilton and ended his life. John Adams said at the time of the 
event that: “When Burr shot Hamilton it was not Brutus killing Caesar in the Senate—
House, but it was killing him before he passed the Rubicon.”70 In Adam’s understanding 
Hamilton was Caesar reborn to terrorize the American Republic and Burr the hero who 
stopped him. An ironic interpretation from Adams, at least in Hamilton’s mind, where 
Burr was not simply a villain he was “an embryo Caesar.”71 Thus, the two men were cast 
in the same role, but for starkly different reasons, Hamilton for his love of a strong 
government and military and Burr for his populist leanings. This complicated scale of 
address, whereby two opposing members, so opposed in fact one killed the other, could 
be represented by the same figure is crucial to understanding the period. 
 That is a goal of this paper, to expand beyond just Alexander Hamilton and 
Aaron Burr and understand how Julius Caesar and his compatriot Catiline, a Roman who 
was despised even more than Caesar for his rebellion, operated in the American Republic 
in the long 1790s. The political discourse around these two figures has not received the 
needed attention in order to understand their significance to the period. The discourse 
around Caesar and Catiline was not merely reflective or philosophical ponderings about 
the past but bore actual political consequence. As Eran Shalev shows, Early Americans 
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were actively engaged in the reenactment of the classics.72 Therefore, classical modes of 
discourse surrounding Catiline and Caesar must, be taken seriously as allusions and as 
powerful political tools in the battle for the very survival of the Early American Republic. 
Reenactment here does not mean that Early Americans were literally putting on togas and 
wielding gladii in epic battles. Rather, the term is referring to the active engagement with 
the classics by Early Americas who did not see the classical past as a road map for what 
could happen, but saw their allusions to the classical world as offering real examples of 
the dangers of rebellion and ambition in the early republic. An example of this use of 
reenactment, as a form of extended classical allusion, was the Whiskey Rebellion that 
will serve as the primary case study of this paper in order to demonstrate how classical 
allusions to Caesar and Catiline were deployed by Early Americans as more than just 
insults, but also as warnings of the real consequences these figures had on Rome, and 
could have on Early America.  
John Pocock’s seminal book the Machiavellian Moment traces the thread of 
Classical thought into the Renaissance and into Early America. In this way he sees 
republican thought through a progression but not in a straight line. He rejects the direct 
link between Roman ideas and Early American values arguing that the millenniums 
between them had seen these ideas filtered through several times. Starting with Florence 
and Machiavelli but continuing on with other English and French authors before settling 
in America. This masterful insight must be taken into account when grappling with how 
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Early Americans understood the classics. That being said their modes of thinking may 
have changed but they were often still reading the original source material.73 Therefore 
there was a direct link to Rome that served to inspire Early Americans to make use of 
Classical allusion.74  
This direct link is excellently captured by Caroline Winterer in her book, The 
Culture of Classicism. Her argument centers around the way that education, certainly 
another love shared with the ancients, played into creating an America obsessed with and 
steeped in the classics. Going so far as to say, “next to Christianity the central intellectual 
project in America before the late nineteenth century was classicism.”75 To Winterer 
then, it was not just that classics were interesting as an area of study but they were an 
‘intellectual project’ of almost equal value to Christianity. No one would question the 
importance of religion to Early America anymore as the plethora of studies dedicated to it 
attest. And yet, classics remain an isolated mode of inquiry that is not perceived as 
lucrative in explaining Early America. The political borrowing from Rome and Greece 
aside, the actual discourse of classics in America was significant. From our modern 
vantage point it can be “difficult for us to grasp how dazzled Americans were by the 
ancient Greeks and Romans.”76 Early Americans were not just eager students of the 
classics but were avid participants in a reimaged classical discourse.  
Eran Shalev makes such an argument in his book Rome Reborn on Western 
Shores where he contends that “we cannot properly understand the political choices and 
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claims made by the American revolutionaries unless we realize that to them, in many 
ways, the world of the ancient Mediterranean was as vivid and recognizable as the world 
in which they were living.”77 This builds upon the revolutionary argument of his book 
that sees Early Americans operating within a “distinct mode of historical thought” that 
saw them living amongst the classics.78 In essence, Early Americans did not just use 
classics as allusions but as a way to reenact history. A way for them to engage with 
history, and in the process make it, was to actively engage in classical discourse. That 
way, like a phoenix, Rome was reborn in America. It was not just rethought, as Shalev is 
deliberate in his choice of word. He sees America as literally engaged in the 
conversations of classics because he argues their mode of historical analysis was actively 
engaged with the past.    
This provocative idea is an important tool to comprehend why classics matter 
beyond simple allusion. Shalev himself does an excellent job showing the importance of 
pseudonyms. And while many authors have engaged with the sources explored below, 
they have failed to fully consider the possibility that the actual use of insults was not 
merely an insult. Rather, early American politicians deployed these terms in ways that 
expressed legitimate anguish over the future of the American Republic. This paper 
follows upon these impressive works, especially on Shalev’s notion of reenactment as a 
theoretical frame, on classics in America to show how the failure of Rome was not just an 
allusion but a legitimate fear of Early Americans. Where many authors have looked at 
classics as a form of high political influence I am concerned with classics as a form of 
personal or low political influence. By this I do not mean the actual influence was 
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lessened. The very nature of politics considered are separate. In this case high political 
refers to examples of republican values and intellectual theory around classical models. 
The sort of discourse only discussed amongst the hallowed Founders. While low or 
personal political discourse on the classics here is about the use of Caesar and Catiline as 
modes of comparison with Early Americans, low in their nature as insults, but 
nevertheless highly important in their effect.  
The names, Catiline and Caesar, were symbolic but that mode of analysis alone 
strips much of the meaning from them. These names were imbued with power; they were 
not just comparisons but also warnings. To label someone a Caesar or a Catiline was 
therefore much more charged than to throw an insult away on a classical illusion. To 
Early Americans the classics were not merely a thought experiment but a direct historical 
example. Thus, the very fears and dangers that surrounded Catiline and Caesar in Rome 
were brought to life in the 1790s. In order to understand this period then, Caesar and 
Catiline must be rescued from being thought of as purely caricatures of evil that held no 
rhetorical power beyond an insult. Rather, these names were used in calculated terms to 
present a specific attack upon someone that was not merely an insult but a warning. 
Those called Catiline and Caesar were not simply identified as a tyrant, ambitious, or a 
traitor in name but in practice. These insults were imbued with meaning and that meaning 
must be restored to fully understand the Whiskey Rebellion. 
Between the two, Caesar was by far the more complicated character in the eyes of 
Early Americans. Pocock said of Catiline that he was “a figure one shade darker than 
Caesar’s on the spectrum of republican demonology.”79 So what made Catiline worse 
than Caesar? Caesar after all brought about the end of the entire Roman Republic. The 
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grandest model of virtue and good government that Early Americans had was destroyed 
not by Catiline but by Caesar. The reason Pocock could claim Caesar was only the 
second worst Roman then leans on the representation of the two figures in ancient 
sources. Caesar wrote his own histories of both his campaign in Gaul and the ensuing 
Civil War. His name was also, to some degree, rescued by the fact his adopted son 
Octavian won the Civil War that broke out after his death. 
 Caesar as a name then was reflective of Caesar as a man who lived a full life. 
Thus, Caesar was a fully embodied life that transcended any singular event. No doubt the 
Civil War was his defining trait and his dictatorship and subsequent assassination the 
story most associated with him but he was also much more. Above all this complicated 
understanding could manifest in military achievements. Something that Early Americans 
were not sure of how to deal with. Was it appropriate to glorify as a general a man who 
was also the death of the Republic, especially when considered it was his military 
abilities themselves that made his destruction of the Republic possible to begin with? 
Alexander Hamilton, for example, mockingly acknowledged that many thought the 
American George Clinton was as “skilled as Caesar” in war but this was “this is mere 
rant and romance.”80 The derision in this comment was not at Caesar but at his 
comparison to Clinton. In fact, by calling the comparison ‘rant and romance’ Hamilton 
was endorsing the skill of Caesar. This skill was accepted; it was the translation of that 
skill to Clinton that was questioned. Caesar, therefore, was not always an insult.  In this 
way Caesar was a complicated character to Early Americans who could be detested and 
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admired by the same person for different ends.  
Catiline, unlike Caesar, had no voice of his own. The only surviving 
contemporary sources of his life were from Cicero, the consul who stopped his 
conspiracy, and Sallust, the historian, who saw corruption as the reason for the fall of the 
Republic. Thus, both had reason to be overly harsh critics of Catiline. He, therefore was 
the greater evil because unlike Caesar he was never given the breath to live. He was 
flattened on the page as a caricature of evil itself. Alive only in the moment of his death 
Catiline was not a life but an event, his conspiracy that threated to destroy the Roman 
Republic. Catiline was from an ancient Roman aristocratic household but had fallen on 
tough economic and political times. Deeply in debt and failing to secure the consulship, 
the highest political office in Republican Rome, he helped organize an insurrection of the 
common sort predicated on the promise to cancel debts.81  But even as such his name 
cannot be easily overlooked as a simple insult. Drawing comparison with Catiline was to 
draw comparison with his treachery and was not just an insult but a warning.  
A warning that was all too real in 1794 when rebellion broke out in Pennsylvania 
over a whiskey tax. The tax had been proposed and eventually passed in 1791 by 
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton was a staunch federalist who 
saw the fate of the republic as dependent on the power of the federal government. He 
understood that money was necessary to the success of any government and that taxation 
was a key method of acquiring capital. It was never a popular tax, not that many were, 
but especially in a new Republic still celebrating its success over the British and their 
hated taxation. Yet it was a lucrative tax, and Hamilton needed it so he was willing to 
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amend, but not repeal it, when it came under attack.82 The events surrounding what 
became the Whiskey Rebellion offer an insight into the political value of classics on this 
lower or personal political level. The rebellion itself has been divorced from classical 
interpretations, which must be restored because Early Americans understood and 
discussed the rebellion through classical discourse. Prominent historians like Thomas 
Slaughter have done excellent work on the Whiskey Rebellion that highlight the frontier 
and the “inter-regional confrontation” that defined it.83 While Slaughter makes a 
compelling argument for the Whiskey Rebellion as an important event that has to be 
understood in its place and time, he fails to evaluate the role of classics in the rebellion. 
Other historians like James Kirby Martin argue for the role of class conflict in the 
dispute. Seeing it as a rebellion that pitted “backcountry farmers” against “Federalist 
leaders.”84 The rhetoric around the insurrection was important because, as has been 
established, the very framework that Early Americans operated in was through a classical 
lens.85 The interpretative power of the event then cannot be understood without 
considering the comparisons drawn with Caesar and Catiline.  
When a mob 700 strong and burning with rage at the whiskey tax marched on tax 
collector John Neville’s home on July 17, 1794, demanding his resignation, they sparked 
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a full blown insurrection that would see almost 13,000 militia respond under George 
Washington.86 This attack was not a spontaneous event, in fact a smaller mob had 
attacked Neville’s home just the day before to no avail. But the roots of this conflict can 
be traced back to the 1791 tax Hamilton put into place. If one wishes, this start date itself 
could be pushed further back to the American Revolution and the desire to avoid 
unregulated and unwarranted taxes. An interpretation never before attempted is pushing it 
back all the way to 63 BC. While, on a literal sense this is not only unnecessary it risks 
completely missing the historical context of the Whiskey Rebellion itself, it is worth 
articulating. Not because it should be done, but because the events of 63 BC were being 
used to frame the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion by contemporaries. Thus, in order to fully 
comprehend the Whiskey Rebellion, the classical framework that was so natural to Early 
Americans must be exposed and understood. While there is no evidence that this 
insurrection was inspired by the ghost of Catiline it would quickly come to be seen in this 
light by some. Catiline had launched a popular uprising in Rome that had threatened the 
very fabric of the republic in 63 BC. He was stopped by one of the Consuls, Cicero, 
someone else of considerable note from the period. A foil to Catiline and so much more, 
Cicero was a hero in Early America. Catiline was no hero, he was a traitor both to his 
class and his people. That is why he was worse than Caesar as an insult in Pocock’s eyes. 
But it was not just about degrees it was also about categories of analysis as Catiline led a 
populist uprising against debt. The Whiskey Rebellion was seen as a popular uprising 
about a tax. The comparison was unmissable and Hamilton pounced on it.  
Writing under the pseudonym of “Tully” in the Daily Advertiser on August 28, 
1794, Hamilton took aim at the insurrection.  First he argued, “it would not be difficult to 
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demonstrate, that a large and well organized Republic can scarcely lose its liberty from 
any other cause than that of anarchy.”87 The insurrection then was threatening anarchy 
because they were ignoring the law by refusing to pay the tax. Hamilton had not 
mentioned Catiline or Caesar yet, but the implication was there, lurking in the idea that 
anarchy was the only legitimate threat to a successful republic. This warning was doing 
double duty though because while Hamilton remonstrated the protesters he also assuaged 
the fears of those who saw the American Republic in jeopardy. The Republic was only in 
danger, as Hamilton argued, because of the internal division created by those who 
resisted the law. If order was preserved, and the law respected then the dangers that 
knocked at the door of young America would vanish.  For respecting the law was the 
“sustaining energy of a free government.”88 Only through the law could freedom reign. 
This comment was again made all the more powerful within the classical discourse it was 
framed within. For once the law was broken and anarchy reigned freedom was lost.  
Hamilton continued his attack with the bold declaration that “such a resistance 
[i.e. The Whiskey Rebellion] is treason against society, against liberty, against every 
thing that ought to be dear to a free, enlightened and prudent people.”89 Hamilton was 
building up to his finale like a musician hitting the crescendo. He explicitly called the 
rebels traitors whose actions were antithesis to those of enlightened and free men. Again, 
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the letter was published on August, 28, 1794, roughly six weeks after the initial violent 
outbreak at John Neville’s home. The situation was tense, with the Supreme Court having 
officially declared a state of rebellion in Pennsylvania on August, 4 1794.90 Thus, when 
Hamilton was calling these actions treasonous he was not being purely rhetorical.  
The entire letter is put into context by the final line, the parting shot by Hamilton 
who said: “to the plausible but hollow harangues of such conspirators, ye cannot fail to 
reply, How long, ye Catilines, will you abuse our patience.”91 It is only once this line was 
delivered that the rest of the letter comes into clear focus. Hamilton was not loosely 
calling them rebels or traitors but was operating within a specific classical framework – a 
framework that perfectly drew comparison between the Pennsylvanian rebels and 
Catiline. In fact, he was literally drawing on this classical tradition as he was 
paraphrasing a quote from Cicero in his orations against Catiline.92 Cicero was the hero 
who stopped Catiline in the eyes of Early Americans. Thus, Cicero was meant to be 
exemplified while Catiline was meant to be abhorred.  
Cicero was not just a model, just as a Catiline was not just an insult, he was a 
promise of republican values. By summoning his image, Hamilton was not just 
positioning the rebels as Catiline, he was taking the role of Cicero. He was the solution to 
the Rebellion, and like Cicero it was only through quick, decisive, and overwhelming 
military force that this would be achieved. All the evidence of this juxtaposed 
relationship was in the pseudonym “Tully” which was a nickname for Marcus Tullius 
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Cicero. The rhetoric of Catiline, therefore, was taken beyond the purely high political. 
The rebels and Hamilton were transformed through the currency of allusion into an 
ancient battle. A battle that already had a winner, Cicero, and a loser, Catiline. Hamilton 
was very aware of this when situating himself as Cicero, even going so far as to quote 
him as he cast the doomed rebels as Catiline.  
Yet this connection should not be seen as inherent or inevitable. Thus far, it has 
been overlooked by historians of the Whiskey Rebellion. Rather, this connection is only 
obvious, and thus powerful, within the context of Early American frameworks that were 
built upon understandings of the classics. The very real points of comparison between 
Catiline and these modern rebels holds no significance outside of the realm of discourse 
that existed and within which Hamilton operated.  
A discourse that was centered around their education as classics was part of what 
Thomas Bender called “civic culture” that permeated beyond formal education to every 
aspect of life.93 In this way, it was not the collegiate educated that could grapple with and 
understand classics. That being said, the founding generation was well educated in the 
classics. Perhaps then it was only through reading the ancient authors that this framework 
was created. As historian, Carl Richard puts it, “they [the Founders] accepted the 
accuracy of these select sources as an article of faith and remained largely oblivious to 
the ancient historians’ aristocratic and other biases.”94 In this sense the authors were 
trusted and their history respected. But what does this tell us about who Hamilton was 
speaking to when he called poor frontier woodsmen Catiline?  
Without a doubt to be steeped in the classics required time and literacy. But 
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Catiline, and especially Caesar, were not just any classical figures, they were two of the 
most famous, or infamous, that ever lived. Their stories must have been widely known. 
As one magazine claimed in 1793, “who knows not that the quarrels of Sylla [Sulla] and 
Marius, Pompey and Caesar?”95 These stories were not just the purview of the classically 
educated. There were only three thousand college graduates out of a population of two 
and a half million during the period but these college graduates were well placed. Over 
half the men who attended the Constitution Convention of 1787 had attended college.96 
While these people were certainly well educated in the classics it should not be assumed 
that only they held knowledge about Rome. These stories were not just for the high 
political minds but resonated on deeper levels. While class and regional differences 
cannot be discounted, the very real notion of classics as a worldview for Early 
Americans, also cannot be thrown out.  
To return then to Hamilton calling the rebels ‘ye Catilines’ he was not just 
throwing away a reference as a literary flourish. He was drawing a direct and easily 
recognizable comparison with Catiline’s conspiracy. These rebels were thus transformed 
from a rabble of Pennsylvanians upset over a whiskey tax and recast as the very mob that 
threatened to destroy the glory of Rome. The comparison then was not just in allusion but 
a reality. These men were not a perceived threat they were a literal threat. Hamilton was 
successful in an extraordinary way as well because he collapsed the entirety of the 
rebellion into a single person. The Whiskey Rebellion, so often seen as a class conflict by 
historians, was transformed then because it was no longer a faceless mob. It was Catiline, 
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unlike a man for man comparison though it was the entire rebellion dressed as Catiline. In 
this way Hamilton used the concept of reenactment that Shalev points to in his work. 
Catiline then, was no longer a word, a name, but an entire historical drama. He was the 
event and the event was apocalyptic in its potential consequence. This was certainly how 
the Romans, like Cicero saw it when they responded, and certainly how Hamilton and 
other Federalists saw it.  
Hamilton wondered how long ‘will you abuse our patience’ because the 
government under Washington was committed to “a peaceful solution” and would not 
begin serious military operations until October.97 This letter then, was after the initial 
outbreak of armed insurrection but before a significant government response. In this light 
Hamilton was evoking Catiline at the rebels but also to his own government. By 
comparing the rebels to Catiline he stripped them of being an unorganized rabble of upset 
frontiersmen who just hated unwanted taxation, like so many Americans had in 1776. 
Recast as Catiline they were treacherous conspirators who were not an idle threat but a 
serious one. Hamilton was not just insulting these rebels then but was aiming at evoking a 
specific reaction. He was playing on the fears of all Americans, across political parties, 
whose “common denominator was the fear of conspiracy.”98  
This irony was not lost on his political opponents who took the opportunity to 
attack him as well. By the end of October Washington had lost interest in leading the 
expedition himself. He left Hamilton behind as leader, along with Virginia Governor 
Henry Lee. A man Hamilton once declared “an officer of great capacity” but was worried 
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that he had a “little spice of The Julius Caesar.”99 Here he was surely referencing the 
dangerous ambition associated with Caesar who toppled the Roman Republic through his 
own lust for power. Caesar was a complicated figure to evoke in a military setting then 
because he could be a compliment, a great general, but also his ambition as a general was 
seen as a constant danger. With these two men in charge of the militia the Republican 
Press was quick to lambast them.  
One detractor questioned Hamilton if he was leading the army “not for the 
promotion of the country’s prosperity, but the advancement of his private interests.”100 
This attack, while not directly using classical imagery certainly plays on the same 
themes. A suggestion that is not just wild speculation, but fits with the classical education 
of Early America. Even without saying Caesar or Catiline this author calls Hamilton’s 
love for military glory and his own ambition into question. It was an easy link then for 
Hamilton to be seen as Caesar or Catiline himself. Even without the use of the names. 
From the beginning “Hamilton… made public his support for strong military measures to 
crush the rebels.”101 In fact, the names themselves were the insult, it was everything they 
represented that proved so dangerous beyond just a cheap insult. This linkage of Caesar 
and Catiline with greed, ambition, and military power then would have been easily made 
by Early Americans. So that it could be understood by the reader without even being fully 
articulated by the writer. In this way Hamilton was portrayed as possessing similar traits 
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to those he detested in the rebels he labeled Catiline.  
About the only thing that both sides of the political aisle could agree on was that 
“may every Catiline meet a watchful Cicero, and every Caesar a determined Brutus.”102 
This was part of a toast given on Washington’s birthday in 1795, just a year after the 
Rebellion was put down. The sentiment was universal in Early America, the lines clearly 
drawn with Cicero and Brutus as the heroes and Catiline and Caesar the villains. The 
point of contention was over who would successfully embody whom? The fact that 
Hamilton was called Caesar by Adams upon his death, and seen as an ambitious military 
man during the Whiskey rebellion did not stop him from casting himself as Cicero 
defending the republic from the destructive Catiline. The Roman figures themselves were 
well developed tropes but were also well worn. Either intentionally, as Cicero was, or 
forced on like Catiline, different Americans were constantly using these names to 
represent personal or low politics that were easily translatable to everyone in Early 
America. In many ways the political battle to determine who would be America’s Cicero 
and who America’s Catiline defined, albeit in a simplified form, the political struggles of 
the Early Republic.  
Hamilton, however, was not alone in characterizing the rebellion akin to Catilines 
some nineteen hundred years before. Writing in January 1795 in the Gazette of the United 
States an unnamed author attacked Robert Mickle, the secretary of the Republican 
Society of Baltimore. While the insurrection started in Pennsylvania it spread into 
Maryland by August of 1794.103 This letter was written only months after the insurrection 
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had spread, but it was also written after the rebellion had failed, as it had by Christmas 
1794.104 So it was that months latter writing only as “One of the People” Robert Mickle 
was addressed.105 The attack begins with a classical allusion, with “downcast looks, and 
humble supplicating voice of Catiline, when attacked in the Senate by Cicero, you throw 
yourselves upon the people and claim their protection.”106 This was in reference to when 
Cicero, the Roman Consul, ousted Catiline in the Senate. Catiline rejected the charge of 
conspiracy placed against him and defended his honor. Cicero was eventually proven 
correct and Catiline was forced to leave the city for his safety and took command of his 
army.  
It was easy to see the personal insults being cast on Mickle through comparison to 
Catiline. On a surface level he was being called deceitful, cowardly, and worst of all 
treacherous. But those words could be used directly, rather, the author deemed it 
worthwhile to directly link him to Catiline. These characteristics were amplified by 
comparison. The old rule for writing held, show don’t tell. By linking Mickle with 
Catiline he was not just calling him a coward or traitor he was demonstrating exactly how 
he was a traitor and exactly what the consequences of that treachery could be.  
The concerned citizen does not stop there but continues saying, “like Bradford in 
the Insurrection, would you have fled your country had you not more than Catiline’s 
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impudence and Caesar’s ambition.”107 Again, Catiline was brought up and this time he 
was connected with Caesar. Mickle was accused of his cowardice being only outweighed 
by his arrogance and ambition. While these traits were dangerous on their own by 
attaching each to an ancient villain the author goes beyond just implying the Mickle was 
‘impudent’ or ‘ambitious’ and actually directly ties his actions to their historical 
consequences. Ambition, to early Americans was a massive charge. “Most of the 
founders attribute the downfall of the Roman republic to ambitious individuals like 
Caesar,” argues Richard.108 Thus, the simple insult of cowardness was overshadowed by 
the historic association of ambition and arrogance directly linked to Catiline and Caesar. 
The very republic was in danger because of actions by men like Mickle. They were not 
just random cogs, not just rabble, they were the engineers of the destruction of the 
American Republic as Caesar and Catiline had been for Rome.  
The letter concluded with an ultimatum of sorts beseeching Mickle to “amend 
your ways” “before it was too late.”109 This author, like Hamilton, and other Early 
Americans did not use classics lightly as cheap insults but as historic examples with real 
world consequences that could be reborn in America and spell its doom. The rebellion 
was over, but if traitors, as this citizen saw Mickle, maintained their wicked ways like 
Catiline they still threatened the Republic. They took these threats seriously, and marked 
them with classical allusions as such. By comparing the rebellion to Catiline the author 
also hinted at how it was doomed to failure, and it had failed, thus it was Catiline reborn. 
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Caesar was successful in his civil war but was then assassinated, but then his adopted son 
gave birth to the Roman Empire. Caesar was in many ways a success story in all the 
worst ways to Early Americans. He managed to destroy the republic. Catiline, however, 
was a failure. His rebellion was crushed by Cicero and the government and the Republic 
endured, for another thirty years. Thus, by comparing rebels, or suspected rebels, with 
Catiline, Hamilton and this author also highlighted the inevitable failure of the rebellion. 
In this way the use of Catiline or Caesar as insults operated on two levels, at the surface 
they represented ideas like ambition, cowardice, and vice but on a deeper and more 
meaningful level they represented history, consequence and the very real fear of anarchy 
and the failure of the American Republic.  
The next month “One of the People” returned to address Mickle once more. The 
fact he signed so simply was important in of itself.  It denoted an understanding that this 
was not a personal insult but a concern of a good American citizen against one who 
would betray the country. It also suggested that anyone could understand the fears he had. 
That the classical allusions he was making were not matters of high politics, of deep 
political thought on republican values, but were personal stories that permeated deeply 
throughout society. This personal politics, or low politics, made his allusion powerful. 
Catiline was not a random choice, he was a universal example in Early America. One that 
any “one of the people” could comprehend and use as political currency. In the January 
letter he even quotes part of Sallust, the historian who wrote the Catiline War. He claims 
after the quote that “every body has read in Sallust” the story of Catiline.110 The author, 
in a widely disseminated and read newspaper, then expected every reader to be intimately 
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familiar with Sallust. Not an arbitrary suggestion either as historian Julie Hedgepeth 
Williams noted that “Americans of all classes and rank” could be literate.111 But be 
including the lines, the author suggests, in fact, not everyone had literally read Sallust but 
that they, nevertheless, knew the story anyways. This widespread knowledge of classics 
was not abnormal for the time, then, but expected. 
 In the February edition he once again leveled the charge of Catiline at Mickle, 
“You carry your impudence so far, as to claim a merit in that some of your members 
joined the army of the president. After the defeat of Catiline, many of his friends in the 
city joined the government.”112 Once again Catiline operates doubly in this statement, 
first as a character reference and second as a historic lesson. What was so interesting 
about this statement was the potential for the implication of Caesar as among ‘his 
friends.’ At the time of the conspiracy Caesar was not the political or military titan he 
would become. The first triumvirate didn’t form until 60 BC and it was only in the 50s 
that Caesar really rose to dominance in Rome. In fact, it was shocking to many Romans 
when Caesar won the civil war against Pompey. The suggestion of Caesar is powerful in 
this February article given the nature of the failed rebellion. Mickle is attempting to 
placate his detractors by showing he worked with the government not against it but this 
concerned citizen saw his defense as flimsy. For even Catiline’s friends turned their back 
on him in his failure.  
When Catiline was in the process of launching his revolt, Caesar was still a rising 
politician without the support of Pompey and Crassus and he had incurred massive debts. 
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Because of the promise to cancel debt by Catiline, charges of conspiracy were also 
addressed to Caesar, but no evidence was ever found and he didn’t actively partake in the 
rebellion once Catiline led his army on Rome. Whether Caesar’s political enemies were 
just taking advantage of the opportunity to attack him or there was something more 
substantial to their claim could not be proven at the time.113 It, however, seems unlikely 
Caesar would have been involved in such a plot, for his political career was still young 
and promising unlike Catilines. This background though opens the possibility that among 
the many ‘friends’ of Catiline who returned to the government fold that Mickle is being 
compared to one could be Caesar. In this way the author discredits these men as not just 
past traitors but also future ones. This idea of being a future traitor was incredibly 
powerful because it showed how even after the failure of the rebellion the fear that 
inspired Hamilton to call the rebels Catiline remained. Even in defeat the rebels and their 
supporters were Catiline’s and Caesars who threatened the stability of the American 
Republic.  
It is worth noting the power of omission, then as well in dealing with classical 
allusions. They formed a strong bond linking the past Romans with the current 
Americans, and thus were only useful so far as the structure of classical understanding in 
Early America allowed them. Beyond the implication of Caesar in the Catiline 
Conspiracy, which was never directly stated but potentially hinted at, two important 
omissions from the ancient story existed when Early Americans talked about Catiline. 
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The first was that Catiline died in battle, a noble trait by Roman standards. In fact, Sallust 
even compliments his death turning his treachery in life into nobility in death.114 He acted 
uncharacteristically in life but in a sense redeemed himself by dying properly. This was 
never mentioned by Early Americans who saw Catiline as the Republic’s great enemy. 
While an argument could be made that death was still a noble concept in the eighteenth 
century, the story of Nathan Hale captures this sentiment, Catiline’s death was not noble 
because he was a traitor.115 There was no room for a complicated view of his treachery to 
Early Americans his conspiracy was simplified to a binary of just and unjust and Catiline 
was firmly in the latter.  
This binary helps explain as well the second great omission from the story, that of 
Cicero. Not Cicero the hero, but Cicero the law breaker, the tyrant if you will. Cicero was 
Consul during the conspiracy and took extraordinary actions to prevent the destruction of 
the Republic. For this most Americans idolized him as a beacon of what true Republican 
virtue was supposed to look like. The ancient story, however, is more complicated, 
Cicero did defeat the rebellion but in the process he arrested and executed several 
conspirators without trial. He broke Roman custom and stretched Roman law, all in the 
name of the Republic according to Cicero. Interestingly enough it was Julius Caesar who 
was most opposed to the dire actions taken by Cicero and suggested something more akin 
to house arrest for the traitors, a novel idea at the time, instead of execution. This more 
complicated narrative whereby Cicero bends, if not breaks, the law and Caesar defends it 
didn’t fit into the linear story of Rome that Early Americans had. They had constructed a 
simple Rome that had heroes and villains. While Caesar, through his pure majesty as a 
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character and abilities as a general, managed to conjure up something of a complicated 
life in the eyes of Early Americans he was still not much more than a typecast villain. He 
could be used as a compliment, but only under the right circumstances. Catiline and 
Cicero though were two opposing points on a binary, the former was evil and the latter a 
hero. Early Americans had read Sallust, and Cicero, whose speeches against Catiline 
were really propaganda, attempting to defend his drastic actions. They had the knowledge 
necessary to come to more complex conclusions about the classics but as Shalev noted 
their unique perspective of history made it easier to see the Roman world simply. And in 
this simplicity they found fear of rebellion, a fear they shared all too well.  
The Whiskey Rebellion then was redressed if not literally in togas, then mentally 
it was wrapped in them. It occupied one leg in Rome and one in Early America, 
straddling the two temporally distant but ideological linked polities. The comparison to 
Catiline, and Caesar, were not simple insults but historical warnings that carried deeper 
meanings that demand further exploration in order to understand the event. The uprising 
has often been seen as class driven, creating a rift between aristocrats and the common 
frontiersman. This narrative has made it difficult for classics to be used as a mode of 
analysis for understanding the rebellion. It, however, was understood by many Early 
Americans in distinctly classical terms. While the narrative offered is skeletal in its 
details and fails to actually outline the event of the Whiskey Rebellion in specific detail 
what it does, or hopes to do, is show how the entire event can be restructured in historic 
analysis as one massive classical allusion that was imbued with meaning through the 
discursive process of comparison with Catiline and Caesar. It was no longer an isolated 
rebellion in the frontier of America, it was Catiline at the gates of Rome. This classical 
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narrative, while not the only available and not the only necessary, has been overlooked 
and is important to conceptualizing how Early Americans conceived of and thought about 
their world.  
The two primary pieces of evidence for this paper are colonial newspapers and 
letters within the Founders online archive. This limited study has some serious faults, 
especially in limiting the purview of who can be talked about to almost exclusively 
literate white men. And not just any literate white men but the Founders, as posterity 
knows them, as problematic and happily Roman as that may be. Certain figures, like 
Alexander Hamilton appear disproportionally. This is mostly due to his enormous 
influence in the 1790s and the fact that he was so in the public spotlight during the 
decade, especially concerning the Whiskey Rebellion as he proposed the tax in 1791 and 
led the military expedition in the fall of 1794. Other Early Americans, however, were 
also engaged in the use of classical insults and allusions during this period. They took to 
newspapers just as Hamilton did to attack their enemies and express real concerns over 
the fate of the Early American Republic. This is not just a story of a Founder, or the 
Founders then, but of Early Americans in full. 
Caesar, did not die at the foot of Pompey’s statue in 44 BC. He also did not die in 
the sunlight of New Jersey in 1804 with Hamilton. Rather he lived on, bodiless but no 
less impactful. In fact, he lives on as just last year a classics professor, Philip Freeman, 
who published a popular history of Caesar wrote an article titled “Rome had Caesar, 
America has Trump. The People Were and Are Desperate.” He captures a sentiment that 
Early Americans would have found baffling when “Caesar crossed the Rubicon River and 
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took over the state as dictator for life, the crowds cheered and welcomed him.”116 Caesar 
was complicated and his representation in Rome was not the concern of this paper. But 
his classical story was not linear and even if he was vilified in Early America he was still 
read, he was still begrudgingly admired for his leadership and martial prowess. Caesar 
found a way, even among the fears of Early Americans to be a challenging figure to 
understand. But in the end, he was always an ambitious man who despite any worthwhile 
characteristics destroyed the republic. Thus, this modern desperation and turn towards 
Trump is a sentiment the founders would have understood as not just an insult but a 
warning, one the American people failed to heed. 
 Then there was Catiline, even worse than Caesar to many Early Americans he 
has become less known in the modern world. He didn’t die draped in valor in the 
Whiskey Rebellion like he did outside of Rome in 63 BC. His death in America was 
slow, subsiding as the fear of internal rebellion fell away. Catiline failed to retain the 
spotlight he held within a country terrified it was about to be destroyed by treachery from 
within. But our modern gaze cannot be tricked into missing his importance. During the 
Whiskey Rebellion Catiline was not just another Roman name to be dusted off by 
intellectuals and thrown about with reckless abandon. He was not solely in the purview of 
a high political discourse of classics. Rather, he was a perfect representation of classics in 
personal or low politics. The Whiskey Rebellion has been treated in a myriad of ways, 
often as a class struggle. Classics needs to be added as a mode of discourse in order to 
properly understand the world view of Early Americans. The class struggle is not rejected 
by Catiline either, if anything it is enhanced by the complications of a Roman context that 
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saw an army of debtors and other rabble threatening the Republic. Catiline, and Caesar 
for that matter, must be addressed because the history of early America is a history that 
cannot be divorced from classics. A history of America, just like a history of Rome 
cannot exist without a history of Catiline and Caesar.  
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